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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
HOUSEHOLD PREFERENCES FOR FINANCING HURRICANE RISK
MITIGATION: A SURVEY BASED EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
by
Damon N. Fitzgerald
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor B.M. Golam Kibria, Co-Major Professor
Professor Pallab Mozumder, Co-Major Professor
After a series of major storms over the last 20 years, the state of financing for
U.S. natural disaster insurance has undergone substantial disruptions causing many
federal and state backed programs against residential property damage to become
severally underfunded. In order to regain actuarial soundness, policy makers have
proposed a shift to a system that reflects risk-based pricing for property insurance.
We examine survey responses from 1394 single-family homeowners in the state of
Florida for support of several natural disaster mitigation policy reforms. Utilizing
a partial proportional odds model we test for effects of location, risk perception,
socio-economic and housing characteristics on support for policy reforms. Our find-
ings suggest residents across the state, not just risk-prone homeowners, support
the current subsidized model. We also examine several other policy questions from
the survey to verify our initial results. Finally, the implications of our findings are
discussed to provide inputs to policymakers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Following an extended period of natural disasters in various U.S. coastal regions,
the insurance market for residential properties has undergone significant financial
instability (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). Public mechanisms for natural
disaster reinsurance have seen dramatic shortfalls following the major storm activity
over the last ten years. After a high number of coastal storms in 2005, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was forced to borrow $17 billion from
the U.S. treasury after its actuarial soundness came into question (Petrolia et al.,
2011). Following major storms Katrina, Irene, Isaac and Sandy the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) was pushed into near bankruptcy by approximately $24
billion in debt (Davenport, 2014). Various state reinsurance programs have had to
grapple with financial shortfalls as well. Florida’s legislature passed a one percent
insurance surcharge on all policy types in order to cover a $625 million loss to its
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund following the 2005 hurricane season(Kern, 2008).
Following the near bankruptcy of the NFIP in 2012, congress enacted the Biggert-
Waters Act1 which required “...the NFIP to raise rates to reflect true flood risk,
1Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was a series of reforms to the
FEMA administered National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) executing by Congress
to address the NFIP’s financial sustainability. The legislation was designed to, in the
words of then current administrator of FEMA Craig Fugate, “Significant concentrated
losses in high policy coverage areas [which] could set the program up for future losses
beyond the authorized borrowing authority.” The main focus of Biggert-Waters was
to remove most of the subsidies and grandfather rates from NFIP which FEMA had
deemed as the main cause of the program’s financial instability after the significant
damage of Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012). Starting in January 1, 2013
property owners with subsidized policyholders saw a 25% increase. Rate increases would
continue for these policy holders would continue “...until rates reflect true risk” (FEMA,
2014). Please see http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1395864920638-
1
Table 1.1: Top 10 costliest Atlantic hurricanes, inflation adjusted 2014 Billions USD.
Name Damage Season Peak intensity Areas affected
Katrina 152 2005 Cat 5 The Bahamas, U.S. Gulf Coast
Sandy 73.9 2012 Cat 3 The Caribbean, U.S. East Coast
Andrew 44.9 1992 Cat 5 The Bahamas, Florida, U.S. Gulf Coast
Ike 41.4 2008 Cat 4 Greater Antilles, Texas, Louisiana, Midwestern U.S.
Wilma 35.6 2005 Cat 5 Greater Antilles, Central America, Florida
Ivan 29.3 2004 Cat 5 The Caribbean, Venezuela, U.S. Gulf Coast
Charley 19 2004 Cat 4 Jamaica, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Florida, The Carolina s
Irene 17.5 2011 Cat 3 The Caribbean, U.S. East Coast, Eastern Canada
Rita 14.6 2005 Cat 5 Cuba, U.S. Gulf Coast
Frances 12.4 2004 Cat 4 The Caribbean, Eastern U.S., Ontario
Source: NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-5
make the program more financially stable, and change how Flood Insurance Rate
Map (FIRM) updates impact policyholders.”(FEMA, 2014) These policy increases
may entice private insurers back into the market and allow for a greater externaliza-
tion of natural disaster risks (Hornstein, 2013). This has been meet with issues of
affordability from policy holders in flood-prone homes, which will see a significant
increase in their rates with a removal of subsidies (Davenport, 2014). After passage
of Biggert-Waters, a significant backlash among policy holders in coastal regions
emerged. This lead to many of the law’s strongest provisions related to correct
pricing of current subsidized policies to be be repealed or delayed, which has again
raised concerns over the financial solvency of NFIP (Verchick and Johnson, 2014).
Increased development into hazard prone U.S. coastal areas has only exacer-
bated problems in Federal and State natural disaster insurance programs (Bagstad
et al., 2007). A mixture of poor planning by local officials and popular Federal
and State subsidies have incentivized continued development into higher risk areas.
Moves towards creating more sustainable programs which more accurately reflect
184532a45a49062ffa8eccdc0f863db1/11-19-2013_IMPLEMENTATION\%20OF\%20THE\
%20BIGGERT-WATERS\%20FLOOD\%20INSURANCE\%20REFORM\%20ACT\%20OF\%202012.pdf
for further information.
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property risk are met with negative reaction by a variety of interest groups (i.e.,
Homeowners, real estate developers, and the construction industry). Residents lack
of risk information due to heavily subsidized premiums continues to create economic
inefficiencies which could lead to tragic consequences.
New directions in policy have included innovative programs that incentivize
homeowners mitigation status, with emphasis on helping low-income households in
high risk areas (Chatterjee and Mozumder, 2014). Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan
(2009) outlines several proposals for dealing with catastrophic risk including ex-
tending terms on required flood insurance coverage for homeowners residing in flood
zones. The creation of a National All-hazards Insurance contract could diversify a
multitude of risks including storm damage (flood, and wind storm), and decrease the
likelihood of losses for the insurer. While a diversity of policy ideas have emerged
recently, the public’s perception of the benefits and costs associated with these pro-
grams are key to their passage and implementation. Therefore, it is paramount that
policy makers have an understanding of homeowners preferences for these types of
policy reforms in order to effectively mobilize their constituency.
Background
The state of Florida is a natural place of study for natural disaster mitigation,
specifically hurricane risk (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). A microcosm of
potential conflict for policy reform, the state has been “...widely considered the epi-
center of the debate with respect to hurricane risk financing” (Cole et al., 2011;
Grace and Klein, 2009). Florida currently makes up approximately 37% of all Na-
tional Flood Insurance Policies (NFIP), which represents the largest share in force
by the federally backed program (FEMA, 2014). Of the policies in force for the
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state, nearly 80% are for single family homes. Kunreuther (2009), in examining
Florida’s flood insurance market found that nearly 75% of single family home po-
lices lie within the FEMA-designated hundred-year floodplains. Despite the poten-
tial exposure these homeowners face, Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) found the
average premium per policy in Florida is among the lowest in the nation. With
the passage of the Biggert-Waters act nearly 13% of NFIP policy holders in the
state could see an increase in their rates (Harrington, 2013). The state’s property
loss reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF), and it’s property
insurance arm, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, have come under criticism
for their current financing structure. Surcharge assessments from storm damage,
which disproportionately represent coastal property owners, are covered by all res-
idents insured within the state. Cole et al. (2011) studied the subsidy payout per
county and found an unequal distribution among counties. In it’s current fiduciary
relationship with the state all losses for FHCF and Citizens are covered by across
the board insurance rate increases (property, auto, etc.) in the form of surcharges
for all residents of Florida.
An understanding of the Florida public’s perception of hurricane mitigation fi-
nancing reform is critical to effective implementation and adoption of new policies.
Uncertainty regarding benefits associated with policy reforms can lead individuals
to default to the knowable choice a` la the status quo (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
Significant theoretical and empirical research on the “status quo” effect has been
developed through out the preference theory literature (Bagstad et al., 2007; Paet-
zel et al., 2012) in particular as relates to public policy support. A citizens lack
of knowledge of specific policy reforms can lead to preferences based on underlying
hurricane risk perception and the potential benefits to mitigation behaviors. Pea-
cock et al. (2005) examined survey results from the state of Florida to find mean
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perceived hurricane risk by location in wind zone as significant. The studies results
suggest that Florida residents’ perception of risk is proportional to the level of risk
associated with their geographical location (i.e., flood zone, distance from the coast,
etc.). However adoption of hurricane risk mitigation activities has not been found
to be as consistent. In examining Florida residence allowance of a free household
hurricane mitigation inspection by the state as a proxy of demand for hurricane
risk information, Chatterjee and Mozumder (2014) found certain high risk house-
holds (manufactured/mobile home owners) less likely to allow inspection. On the
national level, Leiserowitz (2006) examined American’s perception of risk from cli-
mate change in association with support for raising various taxes. While perception
of the risks from climate change were found to be high, support for raising busi-
ness and gasoline taxes was low. Results from the study were examined using the
Collective Interest (CI) framework which posits that individuals will participate in
“...a collective endeavor when the expected value of participation is greater than not
participating.” (Leiserowitz, 2006)
The following is an analysis of natural disaster risk financing reform by examin-
ing the factors that explain Florida resident’s variance in support. The remainder
of this research is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we first develop the theoretical
and empirical specification to understand households preference for policy reform.
Next in chapter 3, using results from a recent survey of Florida homeowners, we
define the variables used in this study. This is followed by chapter 4 with a detailed
analysis and modeling of policy preferences. Finally chapter 5 discusses results and
potential policy implementation.
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CHAPTER 2
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Stochastic Utility Model
We develop the analytic framework for understanding the public’s support for re-
form measures by use of the modeling of ordered choices. The concept of preference
theory for an ordered scale is often referred to in the literature by a variety of names
such as the stochastic utility model, choice modeling, or popular choice models. The
development in the social sciences is largely grounded in revealed preference theory,
where an individual decision maker must select a single choice (often referred to as
a bundle in the economic field) from a set of k≥ 2 options (Chapman and Staelin,
1982). In the context of natural disaster mitigation reform in particular we utilize
concepts from the efficiency-enhancing reforms literature (Paetzel et al., 2012). Here
emphasis is on the individual’s ability to distinguish between the optimally efficient
choice, a set of sub-optimal choices and the status quo. We develop our model under
the assumption that mitigation reform represents an overall positive net benefit for
citizens in the state of Florida. Within this context, a Florida citizen must be able
to evaluate and identify the benefits and costs associated with the selection of the
efficiency enhancing reforms.
To understand the complex relationship of public policy preference of Florida
single family homeowners, we implement the ordinal regression model (ORM) in
order to analyze survey responses for a measured outcome on a Likert-type scale.
The use of ORM is very common in the statistical literature and it’s current form
was developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) and the widely cited McCullagh
(1980). Several comprehensive resources have been published on the subject of
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ORM (Agresti, 2010; Greene and Hensher, 2010; Long, 1997; McCullagh, 1980) in
particular Greene and Hensher (2010) give a concise literature review and include
an historical overview of the model’s development. Their primer identifies over 30
different applications of ORM in the literature include statistical analysis of skill
level, education attainment, occupational level and Likert type responses. In partic-
ular for this study, the ORM is widely used in the hurricane mitigation literature.
Petrolia et al. (2011) employ survey data and experiment-based risk preferences
from households in three states, including Florida, to model probabilities for hold-
ing flood insurance. A probit specification is used to model a mixture of covariates
including risk perception, demographics, and residential structural type. Modeling
households decisions for mitigation is measured via shutter usage and envelope cov-
erage by Peacock (2003). Here the dependent variable for the ORM was six ranked
categories for window coverage. Mozumder et al. (2011) analyze survey responses
from decision makers and experts employed in the Florida Keys on their concern over
potential impacts of climate change on the region. A series of ordered logistic regres-
sion models are fit to groupings of variables including demographics, climate change
concern, and economic loss (via property, natural resources, and tourism revenues).
Their findings measure a subset of Florida policymakers implicit understanding of
risk and response measures. Stoutenborough et al. (2013) examine competing the-
oretical interpretations for policy preferences on support for U.S. nuclear energy
policies. Covariates used in the model include various attitudinal indicators (trust
in government,environmental concerns), knowledge and risk perceptions related to
nuclear energy and demographic indicators. We adopt the ordered choice model to
examine an individual’s rank of preferences for policy change based on their vector
of characteristics xi.
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Model
Let the response Yi have j=1,2,...,J ordered categories with probabilities pi1(x),
pi2(x), ...,piJ(x), and be distributed as multinomial with parameters (pi, n). Here x
is our vector of covariates for subject i, were we define the cumulative probabilities
for the probability that the ith observation falls in or below response category j as:
γj(x) = P (Y ≤ j|xi) = pii1 + pii2 + . . .+ piij (2.1)
In order to capture the notion of stochastic ordering we must adopt a functional
form which allows for a monotone increasing mapping of the interval (0,1) onto
(−∞,∞). We define our general form as:
link(γij) = αj − β′xi (2.2)
where β is the corresponding set of regression parameters for X. Here we develop
the model in its general form and leave discussion of the link function to later.
Estimation
Once a link function is specified, parameter (αj,β) must be computed via Maximum
Likelihood Estimation(MLE) methods. Our likelihood function is as follows1, let
the probability of the observed y belonging to the jth category for the ith subject
be:
1The following is adapted from (Agresti, 2010; Christensen, 2011; Greene and Hensher,
2010; Long, 1997).
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P (yi = j|xi,β,α) =

F (αj − β′xi) j=1
F (αj − β′xi)− F (αj−1 − β′xi) 1<j≤ J-1
1− F (αJ − β′xi) j=J
Here F is the inverse of our prespecified link function. Then our likelihood
equation is
L(α, β|y, x) =
N∏
i=1
pi =
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
P (yi = j|xi,β,α)
=
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
[F (αj − β′xi)− F (αj−1 − β′xi)] (2.3)
Taking log of both sides, our log likelihood is
logL =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
log[F (αj − β′xi)− F (αj−1 − β′xi)]
=
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
log(Fi,j − Fi,j−1) (2.4)
For maximizing our likelihood we take partial derivatives with respect to our
parameters α, β.
∂log(Fi,j − Fi,j−1)
∂β
=
fi,j − fi,j
(Fi,j − Fi,j−1)(−xi),
∂log(Fi,j − Fi,j−1)
∂αj
=
fi,j
(Fi,j − Fi,j−1) ,
∂log(Fi,j − Fi,j−1)
∂αj−1
=
fi,j−1
(Fi,j − Fi,j−1) (2.5)
Following from standard likelihood theory we next calculate the variance-covariance
matrix by way of the Fisher Information matrix (I(θˆ)), here we use the relationship:
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I(θˆ)=-H. Where θˆ = [α, β] and H is the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives
of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the ML estimates. As Christensen (2011)
has noted, the covariance variance matrix calculation at this point uses either the
expected Fisher information, based on re-weighted least squares methods, or the
observed Fisher information, calculated based on Newton-Raphson algorithms. In
reality the choice of observed versus expected is a matter of which software is used for
the estimates. Once a distributional form has been selected the maximization of the
log-likelihood function is carried out by numerical algorithms (typically Newton-
Raphson), as no-closed form solution is possible. Further, in order to correctly
estimate the model either α1 or β0 is constrained to zero (this is usually software
dependent but does not effect the coefficient slope estimates).
Model Specification
There is still some degree of debate on the use of ordinal type responses over the
simpler continuous response type. The use of linear regression models (LRM) for
dependent ordinal variables is still widely used in the mitigation literature (Howe,
2011; Peacock et al., 2005) as well as in the general literature, where debate over this
topic is covered extensively by Winship and Mare (1984). The evidence for use of
ORM over LRM is in general based on two arguments, a violation of the assumptions
of LRM and simulations were use of LRM give misleading results. Long (1997)
notes that the only situation were the use of ordinal dependent variables as interval
would be under the assumption that the intervals between each J-1 categories is
equal. The oft-cited Jaccard and Wan (1996) justifies use of the OLS by noting that
departures from intervals did not affect Type I and Type II errors. In examining
consumer satisfaction surveys Peel et al. (1998) find that fitting OLS models to
10
ordinal responses leads to over inflated R2, biased coefficients and often incorrect
size and significant levels. Further, they find that the OLS model has particularly
poor predictive abilities.
Link function selection
Analysis of ordered categorical choices via a generalized linear model requires a link
specification for ORM estimation. The selection of link function for the ORM is
still somewhat underrepresented in the literature (Greene and Hensher, 2010). Of-
ten selection is based on ease of coefficient interpretation (ordered logistic), latent
variable methodology (probit), or simply norms within the particular field (ordered
logistic within the bio-assay literature). Hahn and Soyer (2005) provide one of the
few analysis in the literature to test between the two most popular distributional
types: logit and probit. Using Bayesian specifications (DIC D¯) they find limited
evidence for better fits among the two distributions but only under certain spe-
cific conditions including extreme independent variable levels and in random effects
model fits. Greene and Hensher (2010) gives an excellent example to counter the
motivation for using sample proportions of the dependent variable to choose the
correct link function for an ordered choice model.
We implement our ordered choice regression models based on the logistic link
function, and in particular a variant of the ORM the“Proportional Odds model”(POM)
proposed by McCullagh (1980). This popular form of the ordinal logistic model class,
allows for use of the odds ratio (OR) interpretation for covariates, which assumes
the log odds that Y ≥ j (j=1,2,...J) is linearly related to each X (Harrell, 2001).
There is both a well established literature in particular for the study of mitigation
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and policy analysis using the POM, as well as set a of robust tools implemented in
multiple software packages.
Proportional Odds and Partial Proportional Odds Models
The Proportional Odds model2:
logit[P (Y ≤ j)] = log P (Y ≤ j)
1− P (Y ≤ j) = αj − β
′xi (2.6)
i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j = 1, 2, · · · , J − 1
By stating the POM as (2.6) we are inferring that for a positive βj and an increase
in covariate Xi would correspond to increasing odds for a higher category of Yi. At
this point we make two notes of our POM before continuing. We first note that
our intercept αj (often referred to as a cut point or threshold) corresponds to each
individual j category, in contrast with our coefficient β which is independent of j.
This assumption of a constant effect across all J categories for each βk, (k = 1, 2, ..., p)
is referred to as the parallel regression assumption and for particular specifications of
our model must be tested (see below). Our second note, is that in general estimates
of the model are based on testing assumptions of our β and the αj are of little
interest and therefore will not be mentioned for the remainder of the analysis.
2There is some ambiguity in how the POM is stated. We have found that the three
most common forms are (1)logit(P (Y ≤ j)) = β0j + β1X1 + · · · + βpXp (j=1,...,J-1),
(2)logit(P (Y ≤ j)) = β0j − (β1X1 + · · · + βpXp) (j=1,...,J-1), and (3)logit(P (Y ≥ j) =
β0j + β1X1 + · · · + βpXp (j=2,...,J). This notational issue is further confused by the fact
that each software package for ORM uses a different variant of the above, which can result
in output with different signs and/or interpretation. For our estimation in R all three
packages implemented used either (2) or (3). We will use (2) for the remainder of this
analysis, and make notations if the software output uses a different formula.
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Assumptions
An implicit assumption of the POM is of parallel regressions (Long, 1997). As
noted previously, from (2.2) our cumulative distribution F is evaluated where all
β1,k = β2,k = ... = βj−1,k(k = 1, 2, ..., p). In other words we assume that the effect of
βk is the same for all J-1 categories. This is akin to running J-1 binary regressions
with all slopes being identical for each k. Once the ORM is fit by either probit
or logistic distributions, a test for consistency among the βˆ1, βˆ2,...,βˆJ−1 estimates
must be evaluated. A common option is an extension of the Wald test developed by
Brant (1990). This has the advantage over a likelihood ratio or score methods in that
both omnibus and simultaneous individual tests can be conducted without the need
for additional models to be estimated. The Brant test statistic is asymptotically
Chi-square with (J − 2)K3 df with a null hypothesis equivalent to:
H0 : βq − β1 = 0, q = 2, · · · , J − 1
Brant noted that while this test is useful for establishing support for PO model,
it does not always point towards alternatives if the null is rejected. We augment
our Brant test results by adopting graphical methods proposed by (Harrell et al.,
1998) using separate score residuals, and plots of mean values of X conditional on
Y. This will allow us to inspect if rejection in our test results are violations in the
PO assumptions or the result of misspecification of the distributional form of the
response variable.
3The degrees of freedom, ((J − 1)− 1)K, for the Wald test reflect the number of rows
of the contrast matrix for H0 : β1 = · · · = βJ−1, and a N × (K + 1) matrix X with 1’s
in the first column. See Long (1997) for a detailed description of the computation of the
Brant Test.
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Violation of POM assumptions
While the POM is the most popular of the ORM used in the literature, it’s as-
sumptions are often violated and seldom tested (Capuano et al., 2007; Long, 1997).
However, if parameters are tested and violations of the PO are found the practi-
tioner now must seek an alternate and/or modification to the POM. We adopt the
methods developed by Peterson and Harrell Jr (1990) who proposed an extension of
the PO model called the Partial Proportional Odds Model (PPOM), which allows
for a subset of non-proportional odds explanatory variables. We adapt (2.6) to allow
for a subset q of our p variables (q ≤ p) where the PO assumption is found not to
hold. For example if we allow the PO assumption to hold for coefficients X1 and
X2, but is relaxed for the remaining q variables, we have the following:
P (Y ≤ j) = 1
1 + exp [αj − (X1iβ1 +X2iβ2 +X3iβ3j · · ·+Xpiβpj)]
, (2.7)
j = 1, 2, · · · , J − 1
Software
All analysis and model fitting will be implemented via the R statistical program-
ming platform. No single ORM package was found to serve all the necessary mod-
eling and graphic techniques required, therefore the following four packages were
used: Hsmic(Harrell, 2013a),ordinal(Christensen, 2013),rms(Harrell, 2013b), and
VGAM(Yee, 2010). Currently the only method to implement a PPOM model in R is
via the VGAM package, which was used for our final PPOM models.
14
CHAPTER 3
SOURCES OF DATA
Survey
Our sample data are from a 2012 survey (from May 2, 2012 to June 1, 2012) con-
ducted by the International Hurricane Research Center (IHRC) at Florida Inter-
national University. A random sample of 40,000 households, from a database of
applicants for the My Safe Florida Home (MSFH) program, were contacted via
email. The response rate was approximately 4.3%, with 1,720 responses represent-
ing 69% of all of Florida’s counties. The online survey consisted of five sections
including 40 attitudinal and behavioral questions. Descriptive statistics and inde-
pendent variables used in our models are from a variety of sections from the survey
related to: demographics, housing characteristics, hurricane experience, current and
future hurricane storm damage concern, and attitudinal feelings towards public and
private institutions. The dependent variables used for our OR models derive from
the section titled Public and Private Residential Insurance. In this section, respon-
dents were asked a series of questions regarding their level of support for policy
reform of the current public/private natural disaster residential insurance market.
Responses were on a ordinal rating scale (coded 0-10) as not-supportive at all to
highly supportive for survey policy questions.
Sample Characteristics
The sample was examined and cleaned by removing respondents with a signifi-
cant number of missing and/or erroneous entries, which led to a 18.02% reduc-
tion. Income was missing for approximately 9% of respondents, and was the vari-
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able with the largest number of missing values. Several locational/spatial variables
(County,Coastal Distance, and County Insurance Rate) were calculated based on zip
code data which was missing in approximately 3% of the sample. Median age for
the sample (60) is higher than the state average (40.7)1; however as our respondents
are single family homeowner this falls into the national average. The majority of
respondents are Caucasian (82.5)%, followed by Hispanic (7.3)%, African American
(4.8)%, and all others (5.4)%. Peacock (2003) has noted that even given Florida’s
diverse population, home-ownership will not mimic overall population patterns due
to long-term differences in ownership rates among minorities. On average, respon-
dents have lived in the state of Florida 29.59 years. The highest percentage of the
sample reside in the southern area of Florida (Broward (12%), Miami-Dade (9%),
and Palm Beach (8%) counties). Estimated median income2 was $75,000, which is
higher than the state average of $47,309.
Measures
Dependent Variables
We fit separate ordinal regression models to each of the following policy questions
from our survey:
1All State data is obtained from the U.S. census 2010 Demographic Profile
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.
xhtml?src=bkmk.
2Total household income was originally recorded using a 25 discretized intervals scale.
We use mid-points from each interval and treat income as a continuous variable.
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Surcharge:
Florida funds the insurance system to pay for hurricane damage after-the-fact with
surcharges, regular assessments and emergency assessments on nearly every insur-
ance line in the state (auto, casualty and property insurance). Please note that
eliminating these fees would likely cause currently subsidized insurance premiums
to rise. How supportive are you of Florida continuing to finance shortfalls with sur-
charges, regular assessments and emergency assessments, on a scale of 0 to 10?
Flood(5yr):
A recent study by the University of Pennsylvania found that only 36% of new flood
insurance policies issued between 2001 and 2009 were still in place five years after
they were purchased. How supportive are you of multi-year (5-year) flood insurance
contracts, on a scale from 0 to 10?
Flood(30yr):
How supportive are you of multi-year (30-year) flood insurance contracts, on a scale
from 0 to 10?
All Hazards :
In the aftermath of several recent hurricanes much debate was focused on whether
damages were caused by flooding and should be covered under flood insurance poli-
cies or damages were caused by wind and should be covered by wind insurance
policies. A comprehensive all-hazards insurance program (fire, wind, flood, tornado,
earthquake), which could pool policy holders with diversified risks may create a
more stabilized insurance mechanism and reduce uncertainty about the availability
and affordability of coverage. On a scale from 0 to 10, how supportive are you of
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comprehensive all-hazards insurance?
Catastrophic Savings :
Tax-free household catastrophe savings accounts could permit households to estab-
lish reserves for future losses not covered by wind or flood insurance policies. How
supportive are you of tax-free household catastrophe savings accounts, on a scale
from 0 to 10?
Independent Variables
Our independent variable (IV) selection is based on a review of the literature as it
relates to hurricane mitigation, risk perception, adaption behavior and policy re-
sponse for homeowners in the state of Florida. Our covariates are focused on four
main areas: Demographics, Housing characteristics, Hurricane experience, Risk per-
ception, and Trust.
Demographics
A large set of the hurricane mitigation and risk perception literature incorporates
several demographic variables into their analysis, along with key socioeconomic co-
variates as well. In particular, positive effects as relates to mitigation incentive
programs were found in several characteristics including Age and Gender (female)
(Ge et al., 2011; Howe, 2011; Peacock et al., 2005). Years of residence (Years FL
resident) as relates to mitigation adaption behavior has been found to have mixed
results, across studies. Some studies have shown positive effects for risk perception
and mitigation adaption (Peacock, 2003). While others have found negative effects
18
related to mitigation information (Chatterjee and Mozumder, 2014) and evacuation
behaviors (Lazo et al., 2010). Another common variable from the hazard adjustment
literature is household income (Income) which has been shown to have a significant
effect on various mitigation behaviors. A key finding has been significant support
among lower-income households for a variety of incentive programs for hurricane
mitigation, with higher income groups typically more supportive of investing in
structural protective measures (Ge et al., 2011; Peacock, 2003). Political affiliation
is not a typical variable used in the study of mitigation or risk perception, but is
prominent in the policy preference literature. While a majority of the studies focus
on political partisanship as it relates to climate change policy (Hart and Nisbet,
2011), there has been been significant evidence presenting the importance of group
identification and social identity on public opinion and policy preferences (Nelson
and Kinder, 1996; Sniderman et al., 1993). Prater and Lindell (2000) have noted the
concept of issue framing in the context of natural disaster mitigation measures in
the presence of various political agendas. We include a covariate for party affiliation
(Poltical) in our model to measure possible framing effects for support of policy
change.
Housing Characteristics
As respondents were asked only minimal locational information (other than zip code
information) we use several covariates (Wind Policy, Flood Policy, Coastal Distance,
and County Insurance Rate) to measure a homeowner’s hazard proximity. We cre-
ate a variable measuring distance from the centroid of the respondent’s zip code to
the nearest coastal zone. A positive (inversely proportional) effect should be seen
for distance to coastal regions. We augment our data set with additional county
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level data for average homeowners insurance rates (County Insurance Rate)3. Cole
et al. (2011) consider a similar data set (2009 data Florida homeowners insurance
rates) found significant evidence of a subsidy for coastal residents whereby inland
residents rates were higher than under a risk based assessment structure. Here we
aggregate all private insurers per county to create an index of property insurance
rates regardless of purchase. Purchase of Flood insurance in the state of Florida
is a mix of mandatory and voluntary which is based on location as prespecfied by
FEMA. Examining flood insurance demand from 2000-2005 in the state of Florida,
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) found approximately 18% of all residential
single-family polices in force were for non-mandatory areas (Flood zone X), and
roughly 75% of policies found in the mandatory areas (Flood zone A). The role of
risk aversion and future expected storm damage have been both found to have a pos-
itive impact on flood insurance demand (Petrolia et al., 2011). Additionally we are
interested in measuring preferences of current flood insurance purchasers for reform
of the current flood insurance market (DV’s: Flood(5yr) and Flood(30yr)). Wind
storm insurance purchase is likewise a mix of mandatory and volunteer purchasers.
Florida law requires all property insurance policies to include for this type of cover-
age and purchase is mandatory for homeowners with a mortgage, as stipulated for
underwriting purposes.
Hurricane Experience
Hurricane experience as a predictor for mitigation and storm evacuation has been
inconclusive in the literature. Respondents in our sample had a median number of
3Data is based on Florida Office of Insurance Regulation estimates and measures risk
for a Florida masonry home built in 2005, with a current replacement value of $300,000,
a $500 non-hurricane deductible, a 2% hurricane deductible, no claims in the past three
years, and minimum premium discounts for limited wind mitigation features and no hip
roof.
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one significant hurricane damage experience, with 22.6% of the study having greater
than one. Due to the relatively low percentage of total hurricane experience we
instead construct a storm damage total variable (Storm Damage), which sums the
total interior and exterior damage a respondent has incurred on their property from a
hurricane. We hypothesize that households with higher levels of storm damage totals
will be more supportive of the status quo policy for Surcharge , as those respondents
may associate a fully risk-based system as potentially negatively affecting coverage
as well as higher premiums. The remainder of the policy questions are hypothesized
to be positively correlated with storm damage.
Risk perception
The literature focusing on hurricane risk perception and it’s relationship with haz-
ard mitigation is extensive. Ge et al. (2011) examined Florida household’s response
to a series of incentive programs and found risk perception to be the most consis-
tently significant predictor of support. In estimating structural mitigation measures
of Florida households, hurricane risk perception was found to be highly significant
(Peacock, 2003). We create two likert scale responses (Storm Concern (1yr), Storm
Concern (10yr)) based on a particular time horizon to measure a household’s per-
ception of hurricane risk. Each respondent was asked there level of concern (scale
0-10) of a major hurricane damaging their home this hurricane season and over the
next 10 years. Additionally, each question was asked again but this time specifying
a damage rate of more than 10% of the home’s value. Respondents showed sig-
nificantly higher levels of concern for potential damage within 10 years versus the
coming hurricane season (Wilcoxon rank sum, p < .001). Within the context of our
various policy reforms we hypothesize potentially mixed finding. Our Surcharge asks
for support for the current subsidy-type assessment over a risk based one. There-
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fore, households with higher levels of current concern may be more incentivized to
support the status quo, due to uncertainty over impacts to their current rates.
Trust
A respondents feelings toward reform is considered multi-dimensional, with worry
over effective implementation a major cause of concern (Frewer, 1999). Because
laypersons are less likely to have specific knowledge of risk management and hazard
mitigation strategies, their assessments of policy reform will be based on trust in
technical and policy experts (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). Respondents in our
sample were asked to rate the accountability of four tiers of public institutions
(City, County, State, and Federal) and private insurance companies on a 0-10 scale.
We are interested in measuring the level of social trust that households assign to
these various governmental and private organizations. Trust in these institutions is
hypothesized to be positively associated with support for policy reforms.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Data Analysis
Dependent Variable
Table 4.1 shows the raw distribution of each individual policy question, to allow for
visual inspection of potential trends. Surcharge shows clustering among the extreme
values as well as the neutral position (=6). We note that responses tend to cluster
around neutral and the extreme points for the Surcharge, Flood(5yr), Flood(30yr).
A clear trend in support for the All Hazards, and Catastrophic Savings questions can
be seen from the graphs. The strong support for All Hazards suggests that respon-
dents maybe associating a higher cost with policy maintenance and therefore value
simplification of natural disaster insurance coverage. Further within the context of
the other questions and given the high rate of natural disaster insurance rates within
our sample 1, All Hazards posses the highest net benefit relative to implied cost.
Independent Variable
We next examine our independent variables for potential collinearity, or variable re-
dundancies. The continuous and ordinal scale variables were examined via a matrix
of squared Spearman correlation coefficients, which allows for monotonic non-linear
relationships to be assessed. Figure 4.2 is a dendrogram of our hierarchical cluster
analysis2 with Spearman’s ρ2. Many of our housing characteristic variables (Insur-
1For the total sample (N=1394), approximately 81.9% had Property insurance and at
least one other type of insurance (flood or wind).
2Our cluster analysis is based on the complete-linkage method in the R package hclust.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Policy Question Responses (1=Not supportive, 11=Highly
Supportive)
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Figure 4.2: Cluster Analysis of Independent Variables
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ance rate, Insurance coverage types, total storm damage) tend to belong to their
logical clusters. For example from our second to the left cluster, Insurance Rate and
Storm Damage Total, we would expect single family homeowners in Florida with
higher insurance rates to have experienced a higher rate of hurricane storm damage.
Our clusters of concern variables have significant ρ2 (see vertical axis on Figure 4.2)
which suggests that some degree of multi-collinearity could cause potential issues if
our model is fit with all four variables. Variables which measure a respondents trust
of public institutions reveals clusters based on typical governmental tier system.
Differences among trust of public institutions (City, County, State and Federal) is
not significant (5.99,p>.10). However testing for differences in trust for public in-
stitutions versus private insurance companies is significant (pairwise Wilcoxon rank
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sum test with Bonferroni adjustment, all p<.05). Respondents show significantly
higher levels of trust in Private Insurance companies on average (Median=7) than for
public governmental institutions (Median=6, for all). Based on correlation/cluster
analysis we create one new variables based on our governmental tier clusters. As our
Trust responses are Likert items measured on the same scale we sum their values
into our variable Trust(Public Institutions). Concern clusters are summed as well
to create two new Likert scale variables, Storm Concern (1yr), and Storm Concern
(10yr). Further variable reduction was deemed unwarranted based on the potential
loss of specific coefficient estimates from continued variable clustering.
Model Fitting
Proportional Odds Model
Before testing ORM assumptions of our initial model, we adopt the procedure sug-
gested by Harrell (2001), and check via a graphical method. The assumptions of
ordinality and Proportional Odds (PO) were checked by plotting each of the five
policy questions against our set of individual predictors. One of the main assump-
tions of the standard ORM is an ordered relationship between responses and each
individual covariate. The PO assumption was assessed by finding the expected value
(E(X|Y=j)) for each of our J=11 categories, given that PO holds. Graphically this
allows us to examine differences in our mean X to their respective expected values
if the PO assumption holds. Our graphical analysis showed a significant number of
predictors did not meet the PO assumption, with some values constant across each
of the J=11 categories. However a majority of expected values did show a decreasing
or increasing trend given that our PO assumption held for all questions except for
All Hazards (see below for discussion).
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We adopted the ordinal regression model building strategy outlined in Hosmer Jr
and Lemeshow (2004) and ran separate univariate models for each covariate. Sig-
nificant level thresholds were set at a higher than usual level (.20) to allow for
prospective significant main effects in the full multivariate model. The Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) was calculated for each model which allowed for the largest
maximum likelihood value estimates to be rewarded while at the same time penal-
izing for additional variables in the main effects model. At this point low (<1%)
and no cell counts were identified among several of the variables (Political, Storm
Concern (1yr), and Income). Issues with zero-cell counts and/or low response rates
in the outcome variable have been found to lead to spuriously high chi-square values
in global non-proportionality tests as well as model convergence issues (Christensen,
2011; Peterson and Harrell Jr, 1990; Scott et al., 1997). We tested for potential model
convergence issues related to cell count deficiencies by running initial separate and
full main effects multivariate regressions on all five of our policy questions. Our con-
dition number of the Hessian (the ratio of the maximum and minimum eigenvalue)
for each model was found to be high (>106) suggesting potential model convergence
issues(Christensen, 2011). Further, significant numerical estimation problems were
found in the initial model building stages with several non-proportionality tests fail-
ing to converge. At this point we adopted the method suggested by Stro¨mberg
(1996) and collapsed our 11 pt response type into a new 5 point scale3.
All five point models were significant (LR χ2 p<.001), and a decrease in the
condition number for each model’s Hessian matrix suggested a better fit. AIC’s
for all 5pt models were smaller than their corresponding 11pt counterparts and
our graphical analysis of the PO assumptions for the 5pt model showed a signif-
3Following a data-driven approach, we collapsed the 11 point response scale into a five
point type as the following: 1=1-2,2=3-4,3=5-7,4=8-9,5=10-11.
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Table 4.1: UNIVARIATE PO MODELS
Surcharge Flood(5yr) Flood(30yr) All Hazards Catastrophic Savings
Male -0.523a -0.247c 0.125 -0.153 -0.055
Age 0.003 0.001 -0.013c 0.006 -0.011c
FL Resident(Years) 0.002 -0.006d -0.008c -0.007d 0.002
Democratic 0.615a 0.218 0.036 0.461b 0.19
Independent 0.622a 0.243 0.166 0.581b 0.258
Other 0.274d -0.166 -0.084 0.042 0.222
Income -0.001 0.004a 0.003c 0 0.002d
Wind Policy 0.244c 0.201 0.204d 0.086 0.058
Flood Policy 0.462a 0.453a -0.084 0.279c 0.099
Distance -0.024c -0.008 0.008 -0.02c -0.029b
Insurance Rate 0.144a 0.052 -0.029 0.13a 0.136a
Storm Damage Total 0.059b 0.025 0.034 0.027 0.07b
Concern 1yr 0.072a 0.039a 0.025c 0.041a 0.036a
Concern 10yr 0.062a 0.045a 0.029b 0.039a 0.028b
Private Trust 0.043c 0.022 0.017 -0.005 0.031d
Public Trust 0.056a 0.03a 0.02a 0.014c 0.022a
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05
icant improvement for several variables ( Surcharge:Male, Storm Concern (1yr);
Flood(5yr):Trust(Public Institutions),Storm Concern (1yr); Flood(30yr): Storm Con-
cern (1yr), Storm Concern (10yr); Catastrophic Savings :Age, County Insurance
Rate, Storm Damage, Storm Concern (1yr), Trust(Public Institutions)) however
several seemed to still be problematic in terms of the PO assumption. Based on
improvements in fit, smoothing of likely PO conflicts, and general desire for model
parsimonious we moved forward with the 5pt response type. All variables used in
the main effects models were significant for at least two of the policy questions in
our univariate analysis or considered relevant based on the literature review.
Our final model fitting strategy was to test the PO model assumption via the
Brant test4 for each of our covariates at each policy response. We implement our
Brant test to assess the overall PO assumption as well as individual coefficient
estimates as well and a pre-specified 10% significance level was set as our criteria.
4The Brant Test is currently not implemented in R, therefore our test was run in
STATA. All coefficients from each model were checked for consistency and found to be
within minimum tolerance (<.001 absolute difference).
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Table 4.2: Proportional Odds Models
Surcharge Flood(5yr) Flood(30yr) All Hazards Catastrophic Savings
Male -0.372b -0.277c 0.165 -0.057 0.061
Age 0.008 0.004 -0.014b 0.008 -0.009d
Years FL resident -0.001 -0.008c -0.008c -0.009c 0.001
Political(Democrat) 0.279d 0.058 0.04 0.305c 0.075
Political(Independent) 0.466b 0.11 0.134 0.436c 0.214
Political(Other) 0.196 -0.24 -0.12 -0.074 0.156
Income -0.001 0.005a 0.003c 0 0.002c
Wind Policy 0.159 0.175 0.298c -0.029 -0.007
Flood Policy 0.38b 0.34b -0.164 0.156 -0.033
Coastal Distance -0.015 0 0.003 -0.008 -0.025c
County Insurance Rate 0.055 0 -0.056 0.106c 0.07d
Storm Damage 0.025 0.015 0.045d 0.001 0.052c
Storm Concern (1yr) 0.039c -0.001 0.003 0.02 0.029
Storm Concern (10yr) 0.011 0.04c 0.022 0.017 -0.004
Trust(Public Institutions) 0.056a 0.033a 0.022a 0.015c 0.019b
Trust(Private Institutions) -0.028 -0.019 -0.013 -0.026 0.006
Log L -1413.473 -1434.812 -1461.756 -1210.324 -1350.189
LRχ2 174.728 88.848 50.739 52.607 52.889
AIC 2866.946 2909.623 2963.511 2460.649 2740.379
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05
The results from each overall test5 (H0 = β1 = β2 = · · · = βJ−1) show that
several of our policy responses fail the PO assumption (Surcharge, Flood(5yr),and
Flood(30yr), p<.10 for all). Once the model was deemed to have failed the PO
assumption, individual coefficients were assessed. The null hypothesis for the kth
variable from our 5 questions H0 = βk,1 = βk,2 = · · · = βk,J−1 6, is tested in a
similar manner as our overall test, with J-2 df. Surcharge had the largest number
of significant coefficients (5), followed by Flood(30yr) (4). Two of our questions,
All Hazards and Catastrophic Savings, were non-significant for the Brant omnibus
test. However after examining individual tests and referencing our initial graphical
analysis we find evidence to suggest some variable violate the PO assumption.
5See Long (1997) for a detailed description of the computation of the Brant Test.
6Note that we are not using vector notation as individual variable tests are constructed
by taking the appropriate columns and rows from the matrices required to compute our
omnibus test.
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Partial Proportional Odds Model
Based on the results from our Brant test and graphical analysis we relaxed the
PO assumption for multiple variables. Omnibus variable selection was not selected
as an appropriate method for all five questions. Instead we allow a variable’s PO
assumption to be relaxed on a per question basis. This is based on both our test
results and our hypothesis that some variables will act in a heterogeneous manner
across policy questions. We implement the PPOM fit via the VGAM (Yee, 2010)
package, to estimate models for each of our five DV’s. Estimates of AIC were
included in order to test for differences between our PO and PPO models. No single
variable was found to fail the PO assumption across all policy questions.
Results
All models (PO and PPO) were significant (p<.001) by the likelihood ratio test of
nested models, which suggests our models are an improvement over a simple null
only model (i.e., on with no predictors). Comparing AIC for PO and PPO models
we find reductions in all responses except for All Hazards which shows only a
.2% increase. Likelihood ratio tests were implemented to compare PO versus PPO
models for each response. All LR test rejected the null hypothesis that our POM
is nested in the PPOM (all models p<.10), which indicates that our PO model is
too restrictive. The PPOM has significantly increased our likelihood, and therefore
represents a better fit.
Surcharge
The results from our PO model for policy response question Surcharge suggest that
present concern (Storm Concern (1yr)) is a significant predictor of support for the
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status quo Surcharge policy. Single family homeowners with higher levels of present
1 year concern about hurricane damage have a significantly higher probability of
supporting the current surcharge subsidy policy (p<.05). This implies respondents
in higher risk areas consider changes to the current insurance market as poten-
tially negative. Zip code analysis of respondents with the strongest support (5) for
Surcharge conditional on being from the >75% quantile of Storm Concern (1yr)
are from regions that had recent Hurricane activity (Wilma) and high risk areas
(coastal South Florida). Trust(Public Institutions) is also significant (p<.001) for
support of status-quo policy support. If we contrast this finding with the negative
coefficient (p>.10) for trust in Private institutions implies respondents identify the
removal of surcharge system as a move from state-backed subsidy system to one that
is more market based. Respondents who self-identify politically as Democratic or
Independent have a significantly higher probability of support for Surcharge (base
level=Republicans).
The Brant test results showed that two of our significant variables (Storm Con-
cern (1yr) and Trust(Public Institutions)) failed the PO assumption. We tested
all variables including those found to be non-significant in the PO model. The
PPO model showed significance in previously non-significant variables (Wind Policy,
County Insurance Rate and Storm Concern (10yr)) for particular levels of Surcharge.
The Wind insurance purchase (N=663) covariate was found to be non-significant
(p>.10) in our PO. However via the PPO Windstorm Insurance purchasers have
predicted odds of higher levels of support (P ≥ 4) versus less supportive (O.R=1.58)
of the status quo are significant at only that level. In contrast Flood Policy (N=581)
have a significant higher odds (O.R.=1.47) of supporting Surcharge at increasing
levels, for both PO and PPO models. By implementing the PPOM we find some
covariates are not consistently significant at higher levels as suggested by our PO
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model. Our PPOM results suggest that Storm Concern (1yr) is only significant
at lower levels of support for Surcharge. Our predicted odds suggest an increasing
support for Surcharge only to a neutral preference.
Flood(5yr)
Our PO model results show minimal but significant decreasing odds of support for
changes to the current national flood insurance policy for increasing years of Florida
residency. This is consistent throughout our policy responses, suggesting evidence
for an increasing “status quo” effect for residency status. Statistical significant in-
creasing support for Flood(5yr) in Storm Concern (10yr) (O.R.=1.04) implies re-
spondents are making mitigating preferences in order to decrease costs associated
with potential future hurricane and storm damage. Increasing trust in Public Insti-
tutions is positive in predictive odds for support of Flood(5yr), which contrasts with
Surcharge increasing support for the status quo. PO assumption were violated in
one of our significant variables, Flood Policy. After our PPO model was fit, we find
policy holders of Flood insurance to have significantly higher levels of support for
changes to the current national flood insurance market by implementing mandatory
5-yr contracts for all policy holders. This could reflect current policy holders lower
perceived cost associated with such a policy change (i.e., expected policy period may
be already estimated beyond the 5 year term). The positive coefficient for Income7
indicates that for every unit increase, the predicted odds of support for Flood(5yr) is
positive.
Flood(30yr)
Using our results from Flood(5yr) we find several covariates are consistent for in-
creasing mandatory flood contract to a 30 year term. Also, with the exception of
7Income coefficient reflects a change per $1000.
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Age, non-proportional covariates are consistent across the two flood policy questions.
In particular after fitting the PPOM is the positive coefficient for Income (here only
a slight decrease in the odds ratio to 1.03) and the decreasing odds of support by
years of Florida residency. Trust in Public institutions continues to be significant
across all policy questions. We note that flood insurance does not continue to be as
significant and is negative for several levels of the Flood(5yr) response. This suggests
that 30yr flood terms may have exceed estimated policy period held by respondents.
Supporting evidence of this is found by examining the negative coefficients for Age
which reflects the decreasing odds of support at all levels of Flood(30yr). In contrast
to our Flood(5yr)model, wind storm policy purchasers are found to have significant
positive predictive odds for supporting the longer-term period.
All Hazards
As noted previously we find strong support for an All Hazards type insurance policy,
with responses associated with support representing 74.2% of the total. The results
from the initial PO model show the continued “status quo” effect for increasing years
of Florida residency, although at only a minimal level. Higher county wide average
insurance rebuild rates (County Insurance Rate) are significant in positive predictive
odds (O.R=1.11) for support. This suggests homeowners associate a bundling of in-
surance products as potentially cost minimizing. Respondents who self-identified as
Democratic or Independent both show positive increasing support at each level of
All Hazards, when compared with the political reference level of Republican.
The Brant omnibus and individual test(s) were non-significant which contrasted
with our initial graphical analysis (see discussion below) which showed several vari-
ables failing the PO assumption. Using results from our graphical analysis, and
examining coefficients from 4 (j-1) binary regressions on our All Hazards response
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we fit a PPO model with Male, Years FL resident, and Coastal Distance as non-PO
covariates. Age is found to be positively affecting policy support but only at the
highest level (P(Y>4) and we note an increasing monotonic scale effect across levels.
Trust (Public Institutions) is again positively affecting policy change support.
Catastrophic Savings
Coefficients of several variables are found to be significant with the assumed signs
in our initial PO model. For example Income is positively predictive of support for
tax free savings accounts. While our findings from the omnibus Brant test were
non-significant a graphical examination of plots and coefficient estimates from a
series of binary fits found one variable (Wind Policy) to have potential not met the
proportional odds criteria. Therefore Wind Policy was entered into the PPOM as
a non-proportional odds explanatory variable. Coefficients were consistent in their
sign and significance in the the PPOM.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Findings
The fiscal instability in natural disaster mitigation financing has become of paramount
importance for policy makers on both federal and state level. We began this paper
by showing the significant issues that policy makers face at both the national and
regional levels after a series of natural disasters. While some policy makers have
moved forward legislation to correct long-term financing issues in the property in-
surance market, they have been meet with significant backlash from constituents.
Using survey results from single family homeowners in the state of Florida, we have
examined many of the factors that may contribute to support for reforms in the
property insurance market place. Our analysis suggests that Florida’s homeowners
are supportive of Federal comprehensive insurance as well as tax deferred savings for
storm damage expenses. However we find that many homeowners are supportive of
the status quo and are averse to meaningful reforms. These factors are potentially
contributing to backlash against recent reforms such as 2012 Biggert-Waters Act.
Our findings suggest that a significant status quo effect among long time Florida
residents could be deterring changes to the current system. For four of the five policy
questions surveyed, we find Florida residents with higher years of residency to be
less supportive of changes or neutral. In general we find Florida homeowners in this
study to be neutral on policy questions: Surcharge, Flood(5yr), Flood(30yr). Under
the framework of a“status quo”effect suggests residents do not associate these reform
measures to be efficiency-enhancing and/or lack information to state a preference.
While our survey instrument does not include a specific Biggert-Water Act question,
we can infer that the Surcharge question most closely resembles some of the reforms
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laid out in the legislation. Therefore residents preference may have shifted from
an initial neutral stance to a negative position post-Bigger-Waters passage, when
potential rate increase information was reveled.
Results from our five individual models show significant effects of Trust(Public
Institutions) as a predictor of support for policy reforms. We observe strong support
for the current insurance mechanism in Surcharge, but moderate support for reforms
in Flood(5yr), Flood(30yr), All Hazards, and Catastrophic Savings as well. We
hypothesize that homeowners with higher levels of trust in government may consider
the current funding system for hurricane damage as enacted by the state government,
to be the most optimal. Further research could investigate this result.
Individual results from each of the policy responses show a variety of significant
factors contributing to households preference. We find evidence to support our hy-
pothesis that higher risk perception among homeowner’s will lead to higher levels
of endorsement for Florida’s current insurance system to pay for hurricane dam-
age. Responses to Surcharge show that Flood policy holders with homes located in
higher insurance rebuild areas have significant support for the current system. This
suggests that households in risky areas are estimating higher premiums associated
with a removal of a surcharge funding mechanism. There is, however, significant
support among Flood policy holders for multi-year 5yr contracts (Flood(5yr)). Be-
cause this support does not continue with 30 year contracts (Flood(30yr)), our data
set suggests that households with flood insurance are estimating continued purchase
in between these potential contract terms. Further research could help identify pre-
ferred contract terms for current and future flood policy holders. Support for both
longer term contracts was found to be significant for higher household income levels.
This conforms to our previous hypothesis that increasing income will have a higher
willingness to pay for mitigation measures.
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Respondents were, on average, more favorable towards a Comprehensive All-
hazards type insurance program as well as tax deferred savings accounts to establish
reserves for future storm-damage losses. Our model had somewhat mixed results in
identifying strong predictors for support of either question. Respondents residing
in coastal counties, and those with higher levels of Income had significant positive
support for a Catastrophic Savings type account. This agrees with our previous hy-
pothesis that homeowners’ income levels are positively correlated with savings rates.
Here we can infer that homeowners with higher incomes may also be more incen-
tivized to be supportive of tax reduction policies. Homeowners with higher levels
of previous Storm Damage and County Insurance Rate are also positively support-
ive of Catastrophic Savings, inferring that households are interested in alternative
non-insurance type instruments to allow for hurricane mitigation. Our findings for
County Insurance Rate in Catastrophic Savings and All Hazards suggest that home-
owners with higher levels of insurance rebuild rates may consider these two policies
as cost reduction strategies. Negative effects are found for Coastal Distance so that
approximately every 10 mile increase in the distance to a coastal body respondents
are -76.4% likely to have increasing levels of support for Catastrophic Savings.
Initial univariate analysis of our covariates found significant (negative) correlation
between County Insurance Rate and Coastal Distance (r=-0.287,p<.001), which is
consistent in this model.
Potential Limitations
Therefore we outline some of the potential limitations of this analysis which may
aid in future research. Florida contains a diverse number of residential properties
of which single family housing is a significant percentage. As coastal properties
in Florida tend to be condominium and townhouse owners, we recognize that our
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sample excludes some of the highest risk policy holders who could see the largest
rate increases if the current surcharge funding insurance structure were removed.
We also note that our sample is predominately Caucasian, and while somewhat
representative of the single family homeowners, does not reflect the diversity of
Florida’s population. Minority populations, African-Americans in particular, have
been found to have lower rates of mitigation adaption. These populations also tend
on average to have lower household incomes and are therefore more price sensitive to
potential rate increases caused by a removal of the surcharge system. It follows that
lower income households would also have a decreasing marginal propensity to save
which implies a decreasing level of support for a catastrophic type savings account.
Our analysis shows that decreasing levels of income are negatively related to support
for Catastrophic Savings.
Discussion
The focus of the preceding was an empirical analysis that allowed us to test several
hypothesis related to issues facing policy makers in the area of Financing Hurricane
Risk mitigation in the state of Florida. Our findings suggest that homeowners in
higher risk areas associate of removal of the state’s subsidized hurricane property
insurance with higher premiums. Therefore Policymakers must find a way to address
these constituents who may or may not have the means to afford such rate increases.
We recommend that policymakers adopt the usage of an insurance credit for low in-
come households in higher risk areas. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) outlines
a similar policy that would establish a voucher type system for low-income house-
holds in high-hazard areas that could assist with pre and post disaster situations.
Based on our findings, we additionally suggest that policymakers adopt catastrophic
savings accounts as a means to address the issue of affordability, with the establish-
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ment of an initial endowment fund for those lower income households residing in
high-hazard zones. Households who can afford rate increases could also benefit from
these savings accounts via a system of tax credits.
In order to address the solvency issues in the National Flood Insurance program,
our results suggest that current flood policy holders in the state of Florida are sup-
portive of longer term contracts. However we note that further research is needed
in order to establish an optimal contract period for homeowners and policymakers.
While our findings represent Florida households and may not be representative of
other states, further research could represent an informative first measure in reform-
ing the NFIP. Comprehensive understanding of the public’s perceptions can improve
policy reform measures that are vital to the continued functioning of the financing
of natural disaster mitigation.
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Table A2: Continuous variables.
Variable n x¯ s Min Max #NA
Age 1352 58.8 11.6 27.0 91.0 42
Accountability City government 1344 6.2 2.9 1.0 11.0 50
Accountability County government 1354 6.3 2.9 1.0 11.0 40
Accountability State government 1355 6.5 3.0 1.0 11.0 39
Accountability Federal government 1353 6.3 3.1 1.0 11.0 41
Accountability Private Insurance firms 1354 7.1 3.4 1.0 11.0 40
Coastal Distance 1321 3.5 5.8 0.0 44.9 73
County Insurance Rate 1264 3.8 1.6 1.2 7.2 130
Income 1272 89.1 52.6 20.0 250.0 122
Storm Damage 1394 1.8 2.5 0.0 17.0 0
Storm Concern this year (2012) 1380 6.4 2.8 1.0 11.0 14
Storm Concern this year (2012) > 10% home damage 1380 6.1 3.0 1.0 11.0 14
Storm Concern within 10 years 1380 7.2 2.9 1.0 11.0 14
Storm Concern within 10 years with > 10% home damage 1382 7.0 3.1 1.0 11.0 12
Years FL resident 1372 29.6 16.5 1.0 79.0 22
Table A3: Discrete variables
Variable Levels n %
Ethnicity Ccsn 1114 79.9
AA 65 4.7
Hspn 98 7.0
Othr 73 5.2
missing 44 3.2
all 1394 100.0
Gender Female 588 42.2
Male 786 56.4
missing 20 1.4
all 1394 100.0
Political Party Rpbl 475 34.1
Dmcrt 367 26.3
Indp 201 14.4
Othr 250 17.9
missing 101 7.2
all 1394 100.0
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Table A4: MSFH Survey: Storm Damage variable, specific components
Variable Levels n %
Roof cover failure 0 979 70.2
1 415 29.8
all 1394 100.0
Roof deck failure (sheathing) 0 1311 94.0
1 83 6.0
all 1394 100.0
Roof-to-wall connection failure 0 1367 98.1
1 27 1.9
all 1394 100.0
Wall covering/cladding failure 0 1369 98.2
1 25 1.8
all 1394 100.0
Accessory structure failure (screen enclosures, porches, carports) 0 1164 83.5
1 230 16.5
all 1394 100.0
Damage from wind/wind-borne debris 0 1171 84.0
1 223 16.0
all 1394 100.0
Damage from wind-driven rainwater intrusion/penetration 0 1230 88.2
1 164 11.8
all 1394 100.0
Damage from inland flooding 0 1379 98.9
1 15 1.1
all 1394 100.0
Damage from storm surge 0 1363 97.8
1 31 2.2
all 1394 100.0
Damage from fallen trees/tree limbs 0 1135 81.4
1 259 18.6
all 1394 100.0
Damage from broken/dislodged exterior equipment 0 1332 95.5
1 62 4.5
all 1394 100.0
Broken windows, entry doors, sliding glass doors, skylights 0 1297 93.0
1 97 7.0
all 1394 100.0
Garage door failure 0 1365 97.9
1 29 2.1
all 1394 100.0
Soffit/vent failure (gable-end, ridge, roof, soffit, turbine vents) 0 1298 93.1
1 96 6.9
all 1394 100.0
Gutter/downspout failure 0 1321 94.8
1 73 5.2
all 1394 100.0
Interior contents/furnishings damage 0 1295 92.9
50
1 99 7.1
all 1394 100.0
Interior finishes damage (ceilings, walls, flooring) 0 1221 87.6
1 173 12.4
all 1394 100.0
Ceiling collapse (saturated insulation) 0 1332 95.5
1 62 4.5
all 1394 100.0
Utilities damage (electrical, mechanical, plumbing) 0 1315 94.3
1 79 5.7
all 1394 100.0
Mold growth 0 1318 94.5
1 76 5.5
all 1394 100.0
OTHER 0 1192 85.5
1 202 14.5
all 1394 100.0
51
Table A5: Policy Question response rate (Dependent Variable(s) for ORM)
Variable Levels n %
Surcharge 1 236 16.9
2 133 9.5
3 425 30.5
4 299 21.4
5 276 19.8
missing 25 1.8
all 1394 100.0
Flood(5 year) 1 234 16.8
2 95 6.8
3 406 29.1
4 263 18.9
5 335 24.0
missing 61 4.4
all 1394 100.0
Flood(30 year) 1 401 28.8
2 150 10.8
3 369 26.5
4 173 12.4
5 222 15.9
missing 79 5.7
all 1394 100.0
All-Hazards insurance 1 68 4.9
2 40 2.9
3 247 17.7
4 372 26.7
5 641 46.0
missing 26 1.9
all 1394 100.0
Catastrophe savings 1 133 9.5
2 69 5.0
3 309 22.2
4 348 25.0
5 510 36.6
missing 25 1.8
all 1394 100.0
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Table A7: Partial Proportional Odds Model predicting Florida Single Family Homeown-
ers preference for Surcharge.
Estimate Odds
Male -0.368b 0.692
Age 0.008 1.008
Years FL resident 0 1
Political(Democrat) 0.258d 1.294
Political(Independent) 0.448c 1.565
Political(Other) 0.167 1.182
Income -0.001 0.999
Wind Policy∗:1 0.081 1.084
Wind Policy∗:2 -0.078 0.925
Wind Policy∗:3 0.156 1.168
Wind Policy∗:4 0.455c 1.576
Flood Policy 0.376b 1.457
Coastal Distance -0.017 0.983
County Insurance Rate∗:1 -0.04 0.961
County Insurance Rate∗:2 -0.025 0.975
County Insurance Rate∗:3 0.088d 1.092
County Insurance Rate∗:4 0.117c 1.124
Storm Damage 0.027 1.028
Storm Concern (1yr)∗:1 0.072c 1.075
Storm Concern (1yr)∗:2 0.085a 1.088
Storm Concern (1yr)∗:3 0.036 1.036
Storm Concern (1yr)∗:4 -0.01 0.99
Storm Concern (10yr)∗:1 -0.034 0.967
Storm Concern (10yr)∗:2 -0.02 0.98
Storm Concern (10yr)∗:3 0.024 1.024
Storm Concern (10yr)∗:4 0.051c 1.052
Trust(Public Institutions)∗:1 0.074a 1.077
Trust(Public Institutions)∗:2 0.067a 1.069
Trust(Public Institutions)∗:3 0.047a 1.048
Trust(Public Institutions)∗:4 0.045a 1.047
Trust(Private Institutions) -0.023 0.978
Log L -1394.395
LR χ2(31) 212.884
AIC 2858.79
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05;*Non-Proportional Odds Coefficients
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Table A8: Partial Proportional Odds Model predicting Florida Single Family Homeown-
ers preference for Flood(5yr).
Estimate Odds
Male -0.283c 0.753
Age 0.003 1.003
Years FL resident -0.008c 0.992
Political(Democrat) 0.043 1.044
Political(Independent) 0.098 1.103
Political(Other) -0.242 0.785
Income 0.005a 1.005
Wind Policy 0.17 1.186
Flood Policy∗:1 0.073 1.076
Flood Policy∗:2 0.216 1.241
Flood Policy∗:3 0.339c 1.403
Flood Policy∗:4 0.6a 1.822
Coastal Distance 0.001 1.001
County Insurance Rate 0.001 1.001
Storm Damage 0.015 1.015
Storm Concern (1yr) 0 1
Storm Concern (10yr) 0.039c 1.039
Trust(Public Institutions) 0.032a 1.033
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:1 -0.035 0.965
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:2 -0.024 0.976
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:3 -0.03 0.97
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:4 0.004 1.004
Log L -1429.465
LR χ2(22) 99.54
AIC 2910.931
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05;*Non-Proportional Odds Coefficients
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Table A9: Partial Proportional Odds Model predicting Florida Single Family Homeown-
ers preference for Flood(30yr).
Estimate Odds
Male∗:1 0.105 1.111
Male∗:2 0.039 1.04
Male∗:3 0.373c 1.452
Male∗:4 0.151 1.164
Age∗:1 -0.021b 0.979
Age∗:2 -0.013c 0.987
Age∗:3 -0.01 0.99
Age∗:4 -0.007 0.993
Years FL resident -0.008c 0.992
Political(Democrat) 0.034 1.035
Political(Independent) 0.133 1.142
Political(Other) -0.135 0.874
Income 0.003c 1.003
Wind Policy 0.31c 1.363
Flood Policy∗:1 -0.239 0.788
Flood Policy∗:2 -0.288c 0.75
Flood Policy∗:3 -0.13 0.878
Flood Policy∗:4 0.239 1.27
Coastal Distance 0.004 1.004
County Insurance Rate -0.057 0.944
Storm Damage 0.044d 1.045
Storm Concern (1yr) 0.004 1.004
Storm Concern (10yr) 0.022 1.022
Trust(Public Institutions) 0.022a 1.022
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:1 -0.021 0.98
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:2 -0.008 0.992
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:3 -0.03 0.97
Trust(Private Institutions)∗:4 0.017 1.017
Log L -1446.826
LR χ2(28) 80.598
AIC 2957.652
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05;*Non-Proportional Odds Coefficients
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Table A10: Partial Proportional Odds Model predicting Florida Single Family Home-
owners preference for All Hazards.
Estimate Odds
Male∗:1 -0.555 0.574
Male∗:2 -0.188 0.828
Male∗:3 -0.124 0.883
Male∗:4 -0.002 0.998
Age∗:1 -0.013 0.988
Age∗:2 -0.01 0.99
Age∗:3 0.005 1.005
Age∗:4 0.013c 1.013
Years FL resident∗:1 -0.015d 0.985
Years FL resident∗:2 -0.018b 0.982
Years FL resident∗:3 -0.011c 0.989
Years FL resident∗:4 -0.006 0.994
Political(Democrat) 0.293d 1.34
Political(Independent) 0.43c 1.538
Political(Other) -0.081 0.923
Income 0 1
Wind Policy -0.019 0.981
Flood Policy 0.153 1.166
Coastal Distance∗:1 0.039 1.04
Coastal Distance∗:2 0.028 1.028
Coastal Distance∗:3 -0.016 0.984
Coastal Distance∗:4 -0.007 0.993
County Insurance Rate 0.106c 1.112
Storm Damage -0.001 0.999
Storm Concern (1yr) 0.02 1.02
Storm Concern (10yr) 0.018 1.019
Trust(Public Institutions) 0.014c 1.014
Trust(Private Institutions) -0.024 0.976
Log L -1200.476
LR χ2(28) 72.304
AIC 2464.951
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05;*Non-Proportional Odds Coefficients
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Table A11: Partial Proportional Odds Model predicting Florida Single Family Home-
owners preference for Catastrophic Savings.
Estimate Odds
Male 0.067 1.069
Age -0.009 0.991
Years FL resident 0.002 1.002
Political(Democrat) 0.081 1.084
Political(Independent) 0.225 1.252
Political(Other) 0.168 1.183
Income 0.002c 1.002
Wind Policy∗:1 -0.896b 0.408
Wind Policy∗:2 -0.161 0.852
Wind Policy∗:3 -0.103 0.902
Wind Policy∗:4 0.165 1.179
Flood Policy -0.039 0.962
Coastal Distance -0.026c 0.975
County Insurance Rate 0.07d 1.073
Storm Damage 0.051c 1.052
Storm Concern (1yr) 0.03 1.03
Storm Concern (10yr) -0.003 0.997
Trust(Public Institutions) 0.019b 1.02
Trust(Private Institutions) 0.006 1.006
Log L -1340.21
LR χ2(19) 72.848
AIC 2726.42
a p < .001;b p < .01;c p < .05;*Non-Proportional Odds Coefficients
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Figure A1: Ordinality Assumption: Mean of individual covariates vs. levels of Sur-
charge response. The expected value of the predictor, under the assumption of propor-
tional odds, for each Surcharge value is represented as a dotted line.
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Figure A2: Ordinality Assumption: Mean of individual covariates vs. levels of
Flood(5yr) response. The expected value of the predictor, under the assumption of pro-
portional odds, for each Flood(5yr) value is represented as a dotted line.
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Figure A3: Ordinality Assumption: Mean of individual covariates vs. levels of
Flood(30yr) response. The expected value of the predictor, under the assumption of pro-
portional odds, for each Flood(30yr) value is represented as a dotted line.
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Figure A4: Ordinality Assumption: Mean of individual covariates vs. levels of All Haz-
ards response. The expected value of the predictor, under the assumption of proportional
odds, for each All Hazards value is represented as a dotted line.
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Figure A5: Ordinality Assumption: Mean of individual covariates vs. levels of Catas-
trophic Savings response. The expected value of the predictor, under the assumption of
proportional odds, for each Catastrophic Savings value is represented as a dotted line.
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Figure A6: Proportional Odds Assumption: Binary model score residuals of individual
covariates with levels of Surcharge
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Figure A7: Proportional Odds Assumption: Binary model score residuals of individual
covariates with levels of Flood(5yr)
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Figure A8: Proportional Odds Assumption: Binary model score residuals of individual
covariates with levels of Flood(30yr)
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Figure A9: Proportional Odds Assumption: Binary model score residuals of individual
covariates with levels of All Hazards
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Figure A10: Proportional Odds Assumption: Binary model score residuals of individual
covariates with levels of Catastrophic Savings
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